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For almost fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has issued rulings defining
the right of public employees to engage in First Amendment protected speech.
Although the Court’s seminal decision on this important matter, Pickering v.
Board of Education of Township High School District 205,1 squarely rejected the
notion that public employees could be required as a condition of employment to
relinquish their constitutional rights as American citizens,2 the Court nonetheless
placed conditions on those rights from the beginning. Thus, while the Court
in Pickering recognized for the first time that public employees had free speech
rights as part of their employment, the Court also held that First Amendment
protection of a public employee’s speech depends on a careful balance “between
the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees.” 3
Because there has never been a bright line test defining the scope of public
employee free speech rights—and because such a test would be virtually impossible to construct4—the Court has returned to the task of defining the bounds
of public employee free speech in ten cases since first announcing the balancing
test first set forth in Pickering. Taken together, however, these cases create a somewhat meandering picture, sometimes focusing on the employee as citizen and
sometimes focusing on the employee as troublemaker. As a result, employees and
managers who work in public agencies, along with the lower courts that hear the
competing claims of those parties, might understandably be unsure about what
speech is or is not protected, or how the balance of interests might be struck in
any given situation.
The bounds of public employee free speech were addressed most recently with
a ruling handed down at the end of the Court’s last term, Lane v. Franks.5 That
case held that an agency director’s compelled sworn testimony, made as part of
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a criminal trial against a former subordinate accused of
defrauding the agency, was entitled to First Amendment
protection because the director’s testimony was speech
outside the scope of the his ordinary job duties. In Lane,
the Court distinguished its controversial ruling from eight
years earlier in Garcetti v. Ceballos6 which held that “when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens
for First Amendment purposes.”7 The plaintiff in that
case, a district attorney named Ceballos, claimed that he
was retaliated against and denied a promotion because he
had questioned his supervisor’s judgment in procuring a
warrant and subsequently testified about his concerns in
a criminal trial. The Court in Garcetti ruled, in a five to
four decision, that because Ceballos’ statements were made
pursuant to his position as a public employee, rather than
as a private citizen, his speech had no First Amendment
protection. By contrast, in Lane the Court re-emphasized
the importance of the balancing test originally announced
in 1968 in Pickering,8 finding first that the employee’s
testimony was protected speech, and second that the
employee’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of
public concern outweighed any concerns the agency had
about the possible disruptive effects his truthful testimony
might have on the agency’s reputation.
But how does one know where to draw the line between
one public employee’s truthful court testimony about his
supervisor’s judgment in relying on an allegedly faulty
warrant, made in the context of his duties as an officer of
the court, and another public employee’s testimony about
a corrupt state official, made in the context of his duties as
an agency director? That line remains unclear, because the
Court in Lane chose not to answer the broader question of
“whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ when he
testifies in the course of his ordinary job responsibilities.”9
While the Supreme Court reached the correct decision
in Lane v. Franks, it missed an opportunity to reject the
unnecessarily confusing exception to public employee free
speech rights it created in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Is a public
employee only entitled to speak on a matter of public
concern when the matter in question is unrelated to his
work responsibilities? Must he first say, “Not my job, so
I can comment”?
This article reviews the Supreme Court’s rulings in
public employee free speech cases, discusses the significant
departure from precedent that Garcetti made to those
cases, summarizes the Court’s most recent ruling in Lane,
and argues that the Court should return to the broader
standard the Court originally announced in Pickering.
Were the Court to do so, it would significantly reduce
the confusion the Court has created about whether public
190 LABOR LAW JOURNAL

employees can speak in court—or in other for a—on matters that derive from their ordinary job responsibilities.

The Pickering Foundation
As noted above, the seminal decision on public employee
free speech rights is Pickering v. Bd. of Education.10 In
Pickering, a public school teacher named Marvin Pickering
was dismissed for writing a letter to the local newspaper, in
which he criticized the school board and the superintendent of schools for funding athletic programs at the expense
of academic offerings. The Court held that the termination
of the Pickering was an impermissible infringement on
his protected speech, rejecting the notion “that teachers
may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens
to comment on matters of public interest.”11 Instead, the
Court held, in an opinion by Justice Marshall joined by
seven other members of the Court,12 that public school
teachers and other public employees enjoyed the right (not
the privilege) of free speech. But, the Court added, the
free speech right of public employees is not unfettered.13
Rather, stated the Court, “[t]he problem in any case is to
arrive at a balance between the interest of the teacher, as
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”14 The balancing test established in Pickering
was stated in general terms, with the Court noting the
impossibility of anticipating the variety of circumstances
in which a public employee’s statements might be balanced
against the employer’s exercise of managerial efficiency.
Nonetheless, three factors were set out by the Court in
striking the balance: (1) the parties’ working relationship;
(2) the detrimental effect of the speech on the employer;
and (3) the nature of the issue upon which the employee
spoke and the relationship of the employee to that issue.15
The Court, in weighing the first factor (the parties’
working relationship), noted that Marvin Pickering’s letter to the newspaper criticized the policies of the school
board—not his direct supervisors, with whom he had to
maintain a close working relationship. There was neither
a threat to his immediate supervisor’s ability to maintain
necessary discipline at the work site, nor a close working
relationship between the board members and one of the
system’s teachers. Turning to the second factor (the detrimental effect on the employer), the Court found that
the letter amounted to nothing more than a difference of
opinion over allocation of school board funds, and that
the mere act of airing an opinion in the newspaper did
not substantially impair the board’s ability to make that
WINTER 2014

allocation. Further, there was no demonstration of any
disruption of the workplace or disharmony among the
school system’s employees as a result of the publication
of the letter. Finally, the Court examined the third factor
(the relationship of the speaker to the matter) and found
that this factor weighed in the employee’s favor as well.
The matter of public concern was the proper allocation
of school funding, which was to be resolved through a
referendum by the voting public. As a school teacher,
Pickering was one of “the members of the community
most likely to have informed and definite opinions”16 on
this matter. When there is a nexus between the employee
and the issue, the Court noted, the possibility that the
employee will make a valuable contribution to the public’s
understanding of that issue may tip the scales in favor of
protecting the employee’s speech.17
In many ways, Marvin Pickering was a perfect plaintiff.
He was apparently a competent teacher, not a disruptive
or hostile employee.18 He engaged in a quintessential act
of free speech, writing a letter to a newspaper, acting in
much the same way as any of his neighbors who were following the school board’s deliberations on a local bond
vote might have done. He was not a close ally or immediate staff member who reported directly to the school
superintendent; rather, he was just a teacher in one of the
district’s many schools. The Court’s opinion in Pickering
stands as a testament to fairness, and as recognition of the
appropriate role public employees may play when they join
the public discourse on matters that affect the community
in which they live.

Post-Pickering: The Supreme Court’s
Rulings on Public Employee Free
Speech between 1972 and 2006
A review of the seven cases the Supreme Court handed
down in the period after Pickering was decided and leading up to the Garcetti decision, spanning the years 1972
to 2006, reveals the emergence of two competing views
of public employees who bring free speech claims. Sometimes the Court seems to portray the employee primarily
as a good citizen doing his or her civic duty and speaking
out against wrongdoing by public officials. Sometimes,
however, the Court seems to lean more in the direction of
describing the employee as a disruptive nuisance, trying to
transform every petty workplace gripe into a First Amendment concern and undermining the ability of supervisors
to manage the organization. Of course, the composition
of the Supreme Court changed over this 34-year period,
and with it the philosophies the individual justices brought
WINTER 2014

to the question of balancing public employee free speech
rights may have changed as well. The seven cases decided
during this period are summarized below.
In 1972, the Court rendered its decision in Perry v.
Sindermann.19 That case arose when Robert Sindermann,
a professor at Odessa Junior College (a part of the Texas
public college system) was denied reappointment. He had
been an active member of a group of faculty who wanted
the college to change from a junior college to a four-year
institution, and had been elected president of the Texas
Junior College Teachers Association. In his capacity as association president, he testified before the Texas legislature
and agreed to have his name appear in a newspaper ad that
criticized Odessa’s Board of Regents.
When he was not reappointed, Sindermann challenged
his contract nonrenewal as a violation of his First Amendment rights, asserting that he was punished for his public
criticism of the board and his appearance before the Texas
legislature. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart,20
reversed the lower court’s granting of summary judgment
for the employer, finding that Sindermann should have
had the opportunity to show that his dismissal was in
retaliation for speaking out as a member of the faculty
directly affected by the issue in question. Citing Pickering
as governing precedent, the Court stated: “Plainly, these
allegations present a bona fide constitutional claim. For
this Court has held that a teacher’s public criticism of his
superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible
basis for termination of his employment.”21
Seven years after Perry v. Sindermann, in 1979, the Court
made a slight adjustment to the law of public employee free
speech claims with its decision in Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle.22 There the Court held in a unanimous opinion
by Justice Rehnquist, that when an employee alleges he
or she was dismissed, at least in part, for exercising free
speech rights, it is incumbent upon the employee to show
that he or she was engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct and that this conduct was a motivating factor
in the decision of the employer to fire him or her. If the
employee meets this test, the Court held, the burden
shifts to the employer, who must rebut the employee’s
claim by showing that the employee would have been
fired irrespective of the protected activity. In this case the
employee, a high school teacher, aired his disagreement
about a school dress code in a public forum (a radio news
program) but also made an obscene gesture to students and
engaged in disruptive conduct in the school cafeteria. The
Court seemed particularly concerned that “constitutionally protected conduct” should not be used to continue
the employment of “a borderline or marginal candidate.”23
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The case was remanded, and the lower court found that
the employee’s teaching contract would not have been
renewed, even if his protected speech about the dress code
had not occurred.24
These “mixed motive” cases vary from the circumstances
in Pickering, in which the employee had not otherwise
engaged in misconduct or exhibited poor performance.
While Mt. Healthy added an important caveat to the
Court’s original holding, it did not fundamentally alter the
scope of free speech rights of public employees: the Pickering balancing test remained the touchstone of inquiry.
Also in 1979, the Court was faced with a claim from a
dismissed African-American school teacher named Bessie Givhan who, in a private meeting with the school’s
principal, expressed her opposition to certain school
board policies, claiming they were racially discriminatory.
In that case, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District,25 the Court unanimously held that these discussions constituted speech on a matter of public concern,
even though they took place in private.26 The Court stated
that its prior decisions
do not support the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection against governmental abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides
to express his views privately rather than publicly.
While those cases each arose in the context of a
public employee’s public expression, the rule to be
derived from them is not dependent on that largely
coincidental fact.27
Rather, stated the Court: “Neither the Amendment itself
nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost to the
public employee who arranges to communicate privately
with his employer rather than to spread his views before
the public.”28 Thus, since the employee had alleged, and
the lower court had found, that “the primary reason for the
school district’s failure to renew [petitioner’s] contract was her
criticism of the policies and practices of the school district,
especially the school to which she was assigned to teach,”29
the Court remanded the case for further proceedings with
the understanding that privately-communicated views could
be encompassed within the First Amendment’s protection.
We see the first significant shift in how the Supreme
Court viewed public employee free speech cases in 1983,
when the Court modified the original Pickering test with
its five to four decision in Connick v. Myers.30 This case
arose when an assistant district attorney, Sheila Myers,
circulated a questionnaire to her co-workers seeking their
views on office morale, the need for a grievance committee,
and whether they had been pressured to work on political
192 LABOR LAW JOURNAL

campaigns. She was fired for her activity, and she challenged her dismissal as a violation of her free speech rights.
In an opinion by Justice White, the Court majority created
a new two-pronged test to determine whether the Pickering balance should be applied: (1) did the speech involve
a matter of public concern? (2) If so, did the employee’s
free speech interest outweigh the employer’s interest in
efficient public service?31
The questionnaire circulated by Myers consisted of fourteen entries. Only one entry, the question concerning pressure to work for office-supported candidates, touched on a
matter of public concern, according to the Court. Because
that question was “a matter of interest to the community
up which it is essential that public employees be able to
speak freely,”32 application of the Pickering balancing test
was warranted. The Court then considered the employer’s
right to maintain an efficient workplace by removing a
disruptive employee against the employee’s right to redress unwilling participation in political campaigns. That
redress was sought in the context of a questionnaire that
was otherwise characterized as a personal grievance, and
the Court resolved the balance in favor of the employer.
Noted the Court in Connick: “[W]e believe it apparent
that the issue of whether assistant district attorneys are
pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of
interest to the community upon which it is essential that
public employees be able to speak out freely without fear
of retaliatory dismissal.”33
The two-pronged test created in Connick provided a
means to dispose of free speech claims without having to
weigh competing interests as required by Pickering, if the
ruling court found as a threshold inquiry that the speech
in question was not speech on a matter of public concern.34
As the majority in Connick explained:
Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead us
to conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot
be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a
matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us
to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge. When
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community, government officials
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary
in the name of the First Amendment.35
Because Myers’ questionnaire did include one item
that constituted speech on a matter of public concern,
however, the Court applied the Pickering balancing test
and concluded that the employer’s interests in maintaining
WINTER 2014

a workplace free from undue disruption trumped the
employee’s free speech right to complain about alleged
pressure to work in political campaigns.36 The majority opinion is noteworthy not only because it created a
threshold inquiry that had not previously been required in
public employee free speech analysis, but also because of
its abundant concern for the ability of public managers to
oversee their operations, and to avoid constitutionalizing
every employee complaint. Stated the Court:
To presume that all matters which transpire within
a government office are of public concern would
mean that virtually every remark — and certainly
every criticism directed at a public official — would
plant the seed of a constitutional case. While as a
matter of good judgment, public officials should be
receptive to constructive criticism offered by their
employees, the First Amendment does not require
a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.37
In 1987 the Court was presented with a case in which a
public employee who worked as a low-level data entry clerk
had been fired by her supervisor, a sheriff, for stating to a
coworker, upon hearing of the attempted assassination of
President Reagan, “If they go for him again, I hope they
get him.”38 In that case, Rankin v. McPherson,39 the Court
held in a majority opinion by Justice Marshall40 that the
employee’s speech was protected. The comments were
made in the context of a private conversation with a coworker addressing the President’s domestic policies, which
the employee’s supervisor happened to overhear. Even in
that setting—a private conversation with a coworker in
which a public employee made a fairly outrageous statement—the employee’s statements nonetheless met the
first prong of the Connick test; the speech was on a matter of public concern. Applying the second prong of the
test, the Pickering balance, the Court found no evidence
that the employee’s statement’s had interfered with the
government’s interest in efficient functioning of the office,
or had otherwise discredited the office, since it was made
in private and was overheard accidently by a supervisor.
In a scathing dissent by Justice Scalia, in which three
other justices joined, he observed that the effect of the
majority’s holding was to permit this low-level sheriff’s
department employee to “ride with the cops and cheer for
the robbers.”41 Again, however, the Rankin case did not
alter the basic framework for analyzing public employee
free speech claims.
Two other cases were decided by the Supreme Court
in the twenty years between the Rankin decision and
WINTER 2014

the Garcetti ruling. The first, Waters v. Churchill,42 arose
when the employer, a public hospital, fired a nurse named
Cheryl Churchill for insubordination after she allegedly
complained to a coworker about her supervisor while
taking a break in the hospital cafeteria. Churchill claimed
that the employer fired her because she opposed a recently
instituted policy of nurse cross-training which she believed resulted in understaffing and endangering patient
care.43 A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice
O’Connor, held that a government employer has a duty
to make a reasonable investigation into the circumstances
surrounding an employee’s conduct before taking an action to dismiss the employee for his or her speech.44 That
is, in a free speech challenge, the courts must “look to
the facts as the employer reasonably found them to be.”45
In this way, the Court added a procedural wrinkle to its
free speech jurisprudence, while reaffirming the Connick/
Pickering two part test it had adopted a decade earlier.
Importantly, however, the Court in Waters reiterated the
importance of the third factor in the Pickering test, stating
“Government employees are often in the best position to
know what ails the agencies for which they work; public
debate may gain much from their informed opinions.”46
At the same time, the Court noted, “When someone who
is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency’s
effective operation begins to do or say things that detract
from the agency’s effective operation, the government
employer must have some power to restrain her.”47 The second, Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,48 extended
free speech protection to independent contractors whose
contracts are terminated in retaliation for speech critical
of the governmental entity. The standard for evaluating
free speech claims remained unchanged in both Waters and
Umbehr: was the speech on a matter of public concern,
and if so, whose interests should be given greater weight?
Thus, while there were some adjustments and clarifications to the Pickering standard in the nearly 40 years
between the initial announcement of the balancing test
in 1968 and the Garcetti decision in 2006, including
the significant addition of the threshold inquiry in the
Connick decision, the effect of the Court’s decisions was
to create a framework for employers, employees, and the
lower courts to follow. That framework may be summarized as follows: Did the employee speak on a matter
of public concern? If no, then the Pickering balancing
test is inapplicable and the employee is without protection (Connick). If yes, then the court must balance the
employee’s interest in speaking on a matter of public
concern against the government’s legitimate interests as
an employer in maintaining a workplace free from undue
disruption (Connick). Protected speech may arise in a
193
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public setting, such as a letter to a newspaper or a public
forum (Pickering, Sindermann, Mt. Healthy, Umbehr)
or in a private setting (Givhan, Waters). And even if an
employee engages in protected speech, he or she may still
be dismissed if there are other legitimate, non-free speech
based reasons for the employer to do so (Mt. Healthy).
As noted earlier, however, the framework permitted the
Court to emphasize different aspects of the original Pickering balancing test as it announced its subsequent rulings.
The tension between portraying the public employee as
responsible citizen and the public employee as carping
bureaucrat may be found in a number of the Court’s
opinions rendered during this period. Although public
employees are often viewed as those who may be in the best
position to comment on matters of public concern, given
their familiarity with the public agency in question,49 the
Court was also quite mindful of the need to prevent every
workplace dispute from becoming the grounds for a constitutional controversy.50 Stated another way, the Court’s
opinions recognize both the right of public employees to
speak out when needed and the need for public agency
supervisors to responsibly manage their organizations.
But until 2006, the Court had never focused on whether
the speech in question was wrapped up in an employee’s
official job description. That changed with the Garcetti
decision, as discussed in the next section.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling
in Garcetti v. Ceballos51
Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney for the Los
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office whose duties as
a calendar deputy included supervising other attorneys.
Ceballos was asked by defense attorneys to review the
statements made in a search warrant in a pending case,
because the defense attorneys claimed the statements were
inaccurate. Ceballos did so, and found certain inconsistencies in the warrant. He brought his concerns about the
accuracy of the warrant to his supervisor in a disposition
memorandum recommending dismissal of the case. That
led, in turn, to a meeting with Ceballos, two of his supervisors, the warrant affiant and other employees from the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. The meeting
ended in a sharp disagreement between Ceballos and the
other parties, and his supervisor decided to proceed with
prosecution of the case.52 Ceballos was subpoenaed by
the defense attorneys to testify, and he did so truthfully.
In response, he claimed, his supervisors in the district
attorney’s turned on him, denying him a promotion and
later transferring him to a distant location.53
194 LABOR LAW JOURNAL

Ceballos challenged his employer’s actions as retaliation for engaging in protected speech. He prevailed at
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which determined
that Ceballos’ memo, which recited what he thought to
be governmental misconduct, was “inherently a matter
of public concern.”54 However, the Supreme Court held,
in a five to four ruling authored by Justice Kennedy, that
Ceballos’ speech was unprotected. While acknowledging
the importance of the free speech rights of public employees and even reiterating “the importance of promoting the
public’s interest in receiving the well-informed views of
government employees engaging in civic discussion”55 the
Court had originally endorsed in Pickering,56 the majority
nonetheless found no protection for the employee in this
case. Stated the Court:
The controlling factor in Ceballos’ case is that his
expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a
calendar deputy. . . That consideration—the fact
that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best
to proceed with a pending case— distinguishes Ceballos’ case from those in which the First Amendment provides protection against discipline. We
hold that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.57
“The significant point” in this case, Justice Kennedy
continued, “is that the memo was written pursuant to
Ceballos’ official duties. Restricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”58 In other words, the Court held,
Ceballos actions were simply part of his job description,
and he was merely “perform[ing] the tasks he was paid to
perform”59 as an employee, not speaking as a citizen when
he wrote the memo.
Clearly, the majority opinion added a significant new
limitation to employee free speech claims: because the
employee was carrying out his duties in writing the memo,
the Court held, he couldn’t invoke the protection of the
First Amendment, because he was simply doing his job.
But the majority’s approach ignored two important
aspects of Ceballos’ speech. First, he did not simply make
a statement pursuant to his official duties in his memorandum to his supervisor; he also engaged in a serious
WINTER 2014

disagreement with his supervisor and other officials about
whether justice was being served, and subsequently testified about his concerns with the search warrant—which
was a matter of public concern. How different was Ceballos’ dispute, held in the privacy of his supervisor’s office
and alleging a miscarriage of justice, with that of Bessie
Givhan, held in the privacy of her supervisor’s office and
alleging discriminatory personnel practices? The majority
apparently found these two circumstances qualitatively
different, although four members of the Court did not.
Second, Ceballos was acting in a manner analogous to the
other plaintiffs in the Court’s prior free speech cases, in
that he was directly involved in the controversy or issue
in question, which arose out of the workplace and which
he documented in his memo.
A review of the prior decisions of the Court to see in
what capacity the employee engaged in protected speech
shows the following: Pickering’s letter to the newspaper
was written in his capacity as a school teacher directly
affected by the budget decisions of the school board; Sindermann’s testimony to the Texas legislature was offered
in his capacity as a professor seeking to change the status
of the college where he was employed; Doyle’s complaints
about the school dress code were made to a radio station
as a school employee who had to abide by that dress code;
Givhan’s complaints to her school principal were made in
the privacy of the principal’s office and in her capacity as
a teacher directly affected by the allegedly discriminatory
policies of her employer; Myers’ complaints about political pressure were made to her coworkers at the office as
an employee allegedly directly affected by those pressures;
Rankin’s complaints about the President were made at the
office in her capacity as a member of the law enforcement
community; Waters alleged concerns about patient safety
at a public hospital were made on the employer’s premises
as a nurse whose work was affected by her employer’s allegedly unsafe practices.
In every case, the matter about which the employee
spoke was inextricably linked to the employee’s job; the
employee wasn’t speaking as a disinterested observer of
public policy, offering detached critique, but as someone
with a genuine stake in the outcome of the dispute. How
different was Ceballos’ claim? Not different enough to
warrant an entirely new barrier to free speech protection.
He was deeply involved in the issue at hand, but the fact
that the issue arose at the workplace and as part of his
broad responsibilities as an employee did not significantly
distance him from all the previous plaintiffs.
Further, it is important to note that in the original free
speech case, Pickering, the Court spoke of the right of the
employee “as a citizen”60 to speak. If the public employee’s
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right is to speak as a citizen, then the employee should be
able to speak, as a citizen often does, on matters that affect
him directly, including matters that arise out of his work
responsibilities. This is not to say that the employee should
have unfettered free speech rights, but those rights should
not be restricted beyond the disruption factors Pickering
lists. Citizens speak on matters that concern them directly,
as did the plaintiffs in Connick and Garcetti. And yet,
Justice Kennedy, defending the new barrier to protection
of employee speech, stated that the majority’s holding was
consistent with our precedents’ attention to the
potential societal value of employee speech. . . Refusing to recognize First Amendment claims based
on government employees’ work product does not
prevent them from participating in public debate.
The employees retain the prospect of constitutional
protection for their contributions to the civic discourse. This prospect of protection, however, does
not invest them with a right to perform their jobs
however they see fit.61
Of course, the Court had never held that public employees had “a right to perform their jobs however they see
fit.”62 In fact, as noted in Part III, the Court had always
held that there was a balance to be struck between the
employee’s right to speak and the disruptive effect of that
speech, even when they did so pursuant to their professional duties. What is striking in this case is that Justice
Kennedy ruled as off limits any expression that could be
linked to those items found in a public employee’s job description, rather than acknowledging the fact that whether
an employee’s statements arose out of his or her specific
job duties or not, there is a professional responsibility of
public employees to object to mismanagement or abuse
by a public agency if they encounter it. Such was clearly
the case in Pickering, Givhan, Connick, and Waters. Following the logic of Garcetti, if Bessie Givhan had been
the school system’s Human Resources Director or EEO
Officer, her complaints about discriminatory personnel
practices would have been dismissed as part of her job
duties, not protected speech.
Justice Souter seized on the Court’s sharp reversal of its
previous approach, in which the role of public employees
as informed guardians against governmental misconduct
was part of the rationale underlying all the decisions since
Pickering. Dissenting in Garcetti, he wrote:
As all agree, the qualified speech protection embodied
in Pickering balancing resolves the tension between
individual and public interests in the speech, on the
195
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one hand, and the government’s interest in operating
efficiently without distraction or embarrassment by
talkative or headline-grabbing employees. The need
for a balance hardly disappears when an employee
speaks on matters his job requires him to address;
rather, it seems obvious that the individual and public value of such speech is no less, and may well be
greater, when the employee speaks pursuant to his
duties in addressing a subject he knows intimately for
the very reason that it falls within his duties.63
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, added: “The proper answer
to the question “whether the First Amendment protects
a government employee from discipline based on speech
made pursuant to the employee’s official duties, is ‘Sometimes,’ not ‘Never.’”64 Yet, he noted, the majority opinion
provided a blanket exception to free speech claims arising
out of an employee’s official job duties, holding that if the
speech arose as a part of those duties, it was categorically
without protection.
Predictably, the result of the Garcetti decision in subsequent lower court rulings was to thwart a number of
free speech claims by characterizing the speech as part of
the employee’s job duties.65 That result has been widely
criticized by a number of commentators.66

A Slight Detour: An Employee Claim
brought under the Right to Petition
for Redress of Grievances under the
First Amendment
In 2011, the Court issued an opinion in a case that differed from the line of public employee free speech cases
summarized in this article but that nonetheless invoked the
Pickering balancing test: Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania
v. Guarnieri.67 The case arose after Charles Guarnieri, who
had previously successfully fought his dismissal as the police chief for the borough of Duryea by filing and winning
a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement, filed
a subsequent lawsuit against the town alleging retaliation.
Guarnieri characterized his act of filing a grievance against
the town as protected activity encompassed by the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment, and further alleged that
after he won reinstatement to his job as police chief, the
town council directed him not to work overtime hours
and incur additional costs to the borough. In other words,
Guarnieri argued, the town’s directive forbidding him to
work overtime amounted to retaliation against him for
having petitioned the government in the first place by
filing his original grievance contesting his firing.
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The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that
the absent a showing that Guarnieri’s grievance and his
subsequent lawsuit were on matters of public concern,
he had not engaged in protected activity under the First
Amendment. The Court found that his original grievance
simply contested his dismissal, and his subsequent lawsuit
simply contested his eligibility for overtime payment—and
that neither one was a matter of public concern under the
Connick/Pickering standard. And, reasoned the Court, if
a public employee was not speaking “as a citizen, on a
matter of public concern” when filing suit against a public employer, then he or she could not invoke the First
Amendment. Because there is a close connection between
the right of a public employee to petition the government
and the right of a public employee to speak as a citizen, it
is appropriate, the Court held “to apply the public concern
test developed in Speech Clause cases to Petition Clause
claims by public employees”68 even though the Speech
Clause and Petition Clause are distinct parts of the First
Amendment; that is, the clauses are not co-extensive. This
approach is justified in public employee claims, Justice
Kennedy explained, “by the extensive common ground in
the definition and delineation of these rights. The considerations that shape the application of the Speech Clause
to public employees apply with equal force to claims by
those employees under the Petition Clause.”69
In Connick, the Court had previously held that “a federal
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision allegedly made in reaction
to the employee’s behavior.”70 In this case, Justice Kennedy
elaborated on the Court’s interest in not constitutionalizing every employee complaint, stating:
The substantial government interests that justify a
cautious and restrained approach to the protection
of speech by public employees are just as relevant
when public employees proceed under the Petition
Clause. Petitions, no less than speech, can interfere
with the efficient and effective operation of government. A petition may seek to achieve results that
‘contravene governmental policies or impair the
proper performance of governmental functions.’
Government must have authority, in appropriate
circumstances, to restrain employees who use petitions to frustrate progress towards the ends they
have been hired to achieve. A petition, like other
forms of speech, can bring the ‘mission of the employer and the professionalism of its officers into
serious disrepute.’ A public employee might, for
instance, use the courts to pursue personal vendettas or to harass members of the general public. That
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behavior could cause a serious breakdown in public
confidence in the government and its employees.
And if speech or petition were directed at or concerned other public employees, it could have a serious and detrimental effect on morale.71
Because the lower court had not applied the Pickering test
to Guarnieri’s claim, his case was vacated and remanded.
It is worth noting the Court’s continuing concern with
the potentially disruptive effect of employee speech on the
efficiency of a public agency.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling
in Lane v. Franks72
The Court’s most recent ruling on the bounds of public
employee free speech came this past June. The plaintiff was
Edward Lane, who worked as the director of a program
for underprivileged youth at Central Alabama Community College. In his role as director, Lane had substantial
management responsibilities, including hiring and firing
authority and financial oversight of the program.73 Shortly
after he was hired, Lane conducted an audit of the program
because it was facing severe budget difficulties, and in the
course of his audit he discovered that Suzanne Schmitz, an
Alabama State Representative who was also an employee
of the program, had been collecting a salary without doing
any work.74 When Schmitz ignored Lane’s directive that
she perform her duties, Lane dismissed Schmitz, and testified truthfully in a subsequent federal fraud trial against
her.75 However, after Lane did so, he was laid off from his
position by his supervisor, Steve Franks, ostensibly due to
budget cutbacks. Lane sued, claiming that the real reason
he was terminated was that he had testified truthfully in
the federal trial that led to Schmitz’s conviction.76
Justice Sonya Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a
unanimous Court, holding that Lane’s dismissal violated
his free speech rights. Justice Sotomayor framed the issue as “whether the First Amendment protects a public
employee who provides truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his ordinary job
responsibilities.”77 In a footnote, she stated that the Court
did not need to address the question of “whether truthful
sworn testimony would constitute citizen speech under
Garcetti when given as part of a public employee’s ordinary
job duties.”78 But, she added:
Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties
is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purWINTER 2014

poses. That is so even when the testimony relates
to his public employment or concerns information
learned during that employment.79
The Court didn’t take the opportunity to overturn
Garcetti, but by stating that speech is protected when it is
based on what a public employee knew as a direct result of
his or her employment, the Court may well have reduced
the scope or effect of Garcetti. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor
emphasized that “our precedents dating back to Pickering have recognized that speech by public employees on
subject matter related to their employment holds special
value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of
matters of public concern through their employment.”80
Unfortunately, it is not clear if the Court meant to limit
Garcetti, and there is still a lot of room for confusion.
Remember that in Lane, the employee testified in court
about what he learned and could only have learned in the
course of performing an audit as part of his job, and the
Court held that it was protected speech. In Garcetti, by
comparison, the employee testified in court about what
he learned and could only have learned in the course of
preparing a memo and disagreeing with his supervisors
about the propriety of a warrant, and the Court held it
was not protected speech. The Court in Lane distinguished
the two cases as follows:
Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the course of public employment.
The Garcetti Court made explicit that its holding
did not turn on the fact that the memo at issue
‘concerned the subject matter of [the prosecutor’s]
employment,’ because ‘[t]he First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.’
In other words, the mere fact that a citizen’s speech
concerns information acquired by virtue of his
public employment does not transform that speech
into employee—rather than citizen—speech. The
critical question under Garcetti is whether the
speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.81
What a tortured an unnecessary parsing of speech this
turns out to be. On the one hand, the Court in Lane
lauds the virtues of Pickering, reiterating the Court’s
long-standing recognition of the valuable role public
employees play as individuals who are often in the best
position to speak on a matter that the general public
should be concerned about, and adding that the speech
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in this case was particularly important because it exposed corruption by public official. On the other hand,
saddled with the unwieldy Garcetti distinction of speech
that is part of one’s official job duties versus speech that
relates to or is learned as part of one’s job, the Court
distinguished the two circumstances on a very thin reed
by pointing out that Edward Lane wasn’t hired to be a
regular participant in court proceedings and that Richard
Ceballos was hired, in part, to do so. Of course, it is also
true that Edward Lane wasn’t hired to conduct audits
or to seek out evidence of corruption in Alabama state
government. He was hired to work with at-risk juveniles
and to manage an agency. He went beyond his official job
description and did what a good citizen would do: faced
with evidence of wrongdoing, he reported it to proper
channels and testified truthfully when criminal charges
were brought against a state official.
The Court in Lane, having first determined that his
“truthful sworn testimony at Schmitz’ criminal trials is
speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern,”82 then
applied the Pickering balancing test and found the employer’s interest in suppressing the speech “entirely empty.”83
Stated the Court: “There is no evidence, for example, that
Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’ trials was false or erroneous
or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential or privileged information while testifying.”84 Thus,
the balance of interests clearly weighed in favor of the
employee, and the Court held that the lower court erred
in dismissing Lane’s claim of retaliation for engaging in
First Amendment free speech.85
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Scalia, wrote
an opinion concurring in the result, but adding that the
Court did not address the broader question of “whether
a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ when he testifies in
the course of his ordinary job responsibilities.”86 Justice
Thomas noted that police officers, for example, testify as
a “routine and critical part of their employment duties,”87
but that the Court had properly reserved this constitutional question for another day.

Conclusion: Finding the way
Forward by a Return to Pickering
The Court in Lane v. Franks made the correct decision—
and how could it not have reached that decision? As
Justice Sotomayor affirmed, “The importance of public
employee speech is especially evident in the context
of this case: a public corruption scandal.”88 It is hard
to imagine under what circumstances the Court have
concluded that speech in this context was not speech,
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“as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.”89 But what if the Human Resources Department
of Central Alabama Community College had included
as boilerplate language in Lane’s official job description,
as Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth,
that his duties included “representing the College in
appropriate forums, including legislative and judicial
proceedings”? How could the Court have then avoided
the dilemma created by Garcetti? Fortunately for the
Court, it wasn’t faced with that problem. What it had
the opportunity to do, and didn’t, was to go beyond the
hair-splitting distinction it drew between the employee’s
courtroom speech in Lane and the employee’s courtroom
speech in Garcetti, and to simply admit that Garcetti was
wrongly decided.
Simply stated, the Court go it right the first time around
in 1968: Pickering, together with its refinements through
Connick and other subsequent cases, provides a more than
sufficient framework for analyzing public employee free
speech claims. Pickering guards against constitutionalizing
every workplace dispute, and leaves to the judgment of
public managers the day to day running of public organizations. The Court’s evident concern with the employer’s
ability to function efficiently has always been sufficiently
addressed under the old balancing test. More importantly,
Pickering also protects the right of public employees who
disagree with policy decisions, or who observe waste,
fraud or abuse, to speak up without undue fear of retaliation. Sometimes, as we have seen, members of the Court
seem to be more concerned with one side of the equation
(speaking up) than the other (disrupting the workplace),
but the equation, for all its broad wording and purposeful
ambiguity, works. Even with the limitations of the twopronged test created by Connick, it works.
What the lower courts and public employers and employees are left with in the meantime, when it comes to
speech that public employees make in court settings, is a
very murky picture. Over time, it may be that Lane supplants Garcetti as guiding precedent, and provides a means
for lower courts to rely on Lane to recognize as protected
speech those instances in which public employees truthfully bring forth concerns about waste, mismanagement,
fraud, or unethical conduct by public agencies, even when
the employees are directly involved in administering those
public programs, and even when the employees have some
statement in their official job description that arguably
covers the matter about which they spoke. That approach
would serve the public interest and return public employees to the position they enjoyed previously: appropriately
aware of their duty to report wrongdoing, yet sufficiently
constrained by the need to adhere to workplace rules and
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not to unduly disrupt the functioning of the agencies
for which they work. That would end the need for the

employee to hide behind the claim that addressing the
matter in question was “not my job.”
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